Luiza Rocha is a PhD Candidate at NOVA School of Law and a Research Associate at the NOVA Centre on Business, Human Rights and the Environment Knowledge Centre.
Maria Kaizeler is a third-year Law student at NOVA School of Law and a Research Assistant at the NOVA BHRE. She is actively involved in global advocacy initiatives, including the United Nations Association Portugal, where she works as an intern. Recently, Maria was also selected for the Council of Europe’s Youth Innovating Democracy, where she co-drafted the 2049 Manifesto.
1. Introduction
Brazil is currently considering the introduction of its first import restriction regime specifically targeting goods produced with forced or child labour. Formally introduced in 2015 as PL 2799/2015, the bill originally sought to prohibit the importation of cocoa and cocoa-derived products linked to labour exploitation. Over a decade later, the Brazilian Congress is back to considering a substantially revised version that extends this prohibition to all goods and raw materials linked to forced or child labour within the national market, regardless of the sector.
The proposal’s resurgence occurs against a substantially different regulatory landscape from that in which it was originally introduced, marked by the increasing adoption of forced labour import restrictions and supply-chain due diligence regimes in North America and Europe. It also coincides with external trade pressures, including recent U.S. threats to impose a 12.5% additional duty on Brazilian products on the basis that Brazil lacks effective mechanisms to restrict imports connected to forced labour. The proposal can thus be understood as part of an effort to position Brazil within an evolving global framework in which labour standards increasingly function as conditions of market access.
Against this backdrop, this blog post examines the Brazilian framework proposal for a forced labour ban. Particular attention is given to the legal mechanisms that are expected to render the regime effective in practice, that is, prevent products associated with forced or child labour from operating within the Brazilian market, and the analysis is developed in light of comparable forced labour initiatives.
2. The Brazilian Forced Labour Proposal: Structure, Scope and Regulatory Logic
The substitute text approved in June 2026 by the Economic Development Committee (Comissão de Desenvolvimento Econômico) seeks to establish a prohibition on the importation and commercialization of products in the Brazilian market that are connected to child labour or forced labour. The proposal follows recent international trends towards the use of trade measures as instruments for addressing labour rights violations in global supply chains, but adopts a distinct regulatory model committed to the judicial evaluation of the existence of forced labour.
Its core obligation is established in Article 1, which prohibits both the importation and the placing on the Brazilian market of products whose production process has been found to involve child labour or forced labour. The prohibition, however, is not triggered by allegations, risk assessments, administrative findings, or investigative reports. Instead, the existence of child labour or forced labour must be confirmed through a final and unappealable judicial decision or through a final decision of an international court whose jurisdiction has been accepted by Brazil (Art. 1). This requirement immediately distinguishes the proposal from the models adopted in the United States (Tariff Act and Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act), Canada (Customs Tariff), and the European Union (REGULATION (EU) 2024/3015), where enforcement is driven by administrative authorities empowered to investigate allegations and adopt restrictive measures without a prior judicial determination.
Article 2 further introduces a concept that is particularly noteworthy from a comparative perspective: labour due diligence. The proposal defines due diligence as a “dynamic, continuous and preventive” process through which importing companies identify, prevent and mitigate risks of child labour and forced labour, in a manner proportionate to their size, operating context and risk profile (Art. 2(III)). The language employed closely resembles the principles set out in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. However, the provision merely introduces the concept without specifying its operational content, such as what measures companies must undertake, what evidence would demonstrate compliance, whether supply-chain mapping is required, or whether remediation efforts must be implemented. As a result, one of the central features of the proposed regime is simultaneously one of its most underdeveloped components.
Following the introduction of the concept of labour due diligence, the most innovative provision appears to be Article 4(§3), which states that even where a violation has been established, sanctions may be waived if the importing company demonstrates that it implemented due diligence measures appropriate to its size, context and operational risk profile. In short, this provision introduces a due diligence defence. Yet, once again, the practical operation of the regime remains uncertain because the proposal offers no guidance regarding the content of due diligence. The law therefore creates an exemption whose contours are undefined.
Subsequently, Article 3 creates a governmental blacklist mechanism. Under paragraph 2, the law establishes that the Executive power must publish every six months a list of foreign companies and entities that export goods or services to Brazil and that have been proven to use child labour or forced labour. Inclusion on this list is, however, subject to the same evidentiary constraints that characterise the proposal as a whole. Authorities may rely only on final domestic judgments, recognised international court decisions, or foreign judgments that have been formally recognised in Brazil (Art. 3(§1)). Additionally, foreign judgments must satisfy additional constitutional and procedural requirements before being relied upon (Art. 3(§3)).
Article (4) sets out the enforcement regime. Products imported in violation of the law may be seized and confiscated following an administrative procedure that guarantees the right to defence and clarification of the facts (Art. 4). Nevertheless, the availability of sanctions is significantly limited by another important condition: confiscation is permissible only after the foreign company has already been included on the governmental list referred to in Article 3(§2). Therefore, the regime does not operate as a general system of ongoing customs screening; it targets transactions involving suppliers that have previously been formally identified and listed by the authorities. In this regard, civil society reports, media investigations, whistleblower allegations, supply-chain mapping exercises and independent monitoring reports appear insufficient on their own to trigger enforcement. This makes the regime considerably narrower than most existing forced labour import restrictions.
These provisions reveal a proposal that embraces and departs from contemporary corporate risk prevention regulation, such as due diligence and forced labour, but not their enforcement logic (see Table 1). This creates an unusual regulatory architecture in which companies might be expected to undertake preventive efforts to identify and manage labour-related risks before violations are conclusively established, yet public authorities may only intervene once those same violations have already been judicially confirmed.
3. The Need for Border Enforcement
The institutional design of PL 2799/2015 leaves significant enforcement gaps. In standard customs operations, border enforcement functions as an immediate and preventive shield. As a global supply chain enforcement expert, Laura Murphy, has noted regarding this proposal, customs officials routinely seize and detain suspected counterfeit goods, weapons, illicit drugs, or products subject to anti-dumping tariffs without requiring a prior judicial mandate. In those scenarios, state intervention occurs on the basis of administrative suspicion to protect the market first, leaving the courts to weigh in later.
By contrast, the Brazilian proposal reverses this logic establishing that a product can only be confiscated if the foreign exporter has already been included on a biannual blacklist, which is a listing that requires a final and unappealable judicial decision (Article 4). In practice, because the court disposition time in Brazil is significantly higher than in European countries, judicial processes can take a long time to reach a final resolution and suspected goods will continue to flow freely into the Brazilian market long before any border action can be taken. This feature directly restricts the capacity of customs authorities to investigate and temporarily block suspected goods, a capacity that is standard in jurisdictions like the United States, Canada, and the European Union (see Table 1).
Consequently, for an import ban regime to be effective, trade measures must function as practical and nimble instruments. If Brazil aims to align its legal framework with the evolving forced labour ban agenda, while still acting fast to satisfy international pressures, the final text of PL 2799/2015 will have to be adjusted as soon as possible. Otherwise, the proposed regime risks reproducing the limitations of existing Brazilian judicial mechanisms, especially its lengthy procedures, rather than establishing a preventive enforcement tool capable of reducing labour exploitation by excluding products derived from forced labour.
4. Clarifying the Relationship with Due Diligence Frameworks is Paramount
While the introduction of a “due diligence defence” in Article 4(§3) represents an innovative step, the absence of a clear connection between Article 4(§3) and existing or emerging due diligence frameworks is concerning. Merely referring to due diligence, without setting out the applicable standards, or incorporating existing frameworks by reference, risks creating a fragmented and incoherent regulatory scheme. Contemporary frameworks generally require companies not only to adopt compliance policies, but also to identify risks, prevent adverse impacts, monitor effectiveness, communicate publicly, and provide remediation where harm occurs. A simple reference to due diligence does not automatically import this body of obligations. Unless the proposal specifies which standards are applicable and how compliance is to be assessed, it remains unclear whether the defence reflects a robust due diligence framework or merely a generic compliance obligation.
Furthermore, a more fundamental issue is that the proposal risks confusing two distinct regulatory objectives. Due diligence regimes are primarily a governance mechanism aimed at influencing corporate behaviour throughout the supply chain. Import bans, by contrast, are enforcement mechanisms designed to prevent goods linked to forced labour from accessing a market. They serve different purposes and should not be treated as interchangeable. By focusing on a due diligence defence without clearly establishing either the enforcement architecture of the ban or the substantive requirements of the defence, Article 4(§3) risks raising issues of legal certainty. For instance, it would be unclear whether importers would be expected to conduct supply-chain mapping, undertake risk assessments, commission independent audits, implement remediation plans, engage with affected stakeholders, or monitor suppliers on an ongoing basis.
Equally, the extent of the obligation would be uncertain. Does it apply only to direct suppliers, or does it extend to indirect suppliers operating in higher-risk tiers of the supply chain? Without clearer standards, the provision risks generating significant interpretative disputes and inconsistent enforcement outcomes. From an accountability perspective, a due diligence defence can only function effectively if both firms and regulators understand the evidentiary threshold required to invoke it. Otherwise, importers may be unable to determine what conduct is expected of them, while enforcement authorities may lack a clear basis upon which to assess compliance.
Conclusion
The revised bill represents a major legislative milestone by expanding its scope to all economic sectors and introducing the modern language of labour due diligence. However, by completely stripping customs authorities of the power to temporarily block or detain shipments based on administrative suspicion or civil society risk indicators, Brazil has chosen an exceptionally restrictive path. Requiring a final and unappealable judicial decision before any concrete border action can transform what should be a swift trade defense tool into a slow and bureaucratic process.
The United States, Canada and the European Union rely on the agility of border enforcement. If Brazilian customs officials have to wait years for the judiciary to rule on a specific supplier, goods linked to forced labour will inevitably continue to enter the domestic market and render the law more reactive than preventive.
Ultimately, if Brazil wishes to genuinely satisfy external trade pressures, such as the recent 12.5% tariff threats from the U.S., and build a credible trade defense system, the legislative text must undergo changes. For the new proposal to function preventively, Brazil must empower its customs authorities to act on the ground. Until the country bridges the gap between judicial action and immediate border enforcement, the promise of keeping forced-labour products out of the Brazilian market will remain unfulfilled.
Table 1. Comparative Overview of Forced Labour Trade Regulation Frameworks
Issue |
Brazil (PL 2799/2015 – Substitute Text adopted by the CDE) |
United States (Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (2021)) |
Canada (Customs Tariff (Tariff Item 9897.00.00); Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (2023)) |
European Union (Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market) |
Regulatory objective |
Prohibit the importation and commercialization in Brazil of products whose production process is judicially confirmed to involve child labour or forced labour (Art. 1). |
Prohibit the importation of goods mined, produced or manufactured wholly or in part by forced labour (19 U.S.C. 1307);Prohibit Xinjiang-linked forced labour products and entities (UFLPA, Sec. 3 and 4). |
Prohibit the importation of goods produced wholly or in part by forced labour (Tariff Item 9897.00.00, Section 132 (1)); Fight against forced labour and child labour in supply Chains and amend the Customs Tariff (Supply Chains Act, s. 3 (Purpose). |
Prohibit products made with forced labour from being placed on, made available on, or exported from the EU market. (Art.1) |
Scope of application |
Applies to imported products and their subsequent commercialization in the Brazilian market (Art. 1). |
Applies to all imported goods entering the US (19 U.S.C. 1307);Creates a special regime for all Xinjiang-linked products and entities (UFLPA, Sec. 3 and 4). |
Applies to imported goods produced wholly or in part by forced labour (Customs Tariff, Tariff Item 9897.00.00; s. 136(1)); Applies to supply-chain activities involving goods produced, sold, distributed or imported by covered entities and government institutions (Supply Chains Act, ss. 3, 5 and 9). |
Applies to products across all sectors irrespective of origin (Arts. 1 and 3). |
Trigger for enforcement |
Final judicial decision, final decision of an international court recognised by Brazil, or recognised foreign judgment (Arts. 1 and 3(§1)). |
Administrative determination: CBP may issue Withhold Release Orders based on information indicating forced labour (19 C.F.R. 12.42);Goods linked to Xinjiang are presumed to be made with forced labour and prohibited unless the presumption is rebutted (UFLPA, s. 3). |
Customs authorities may enforce the import prohibition without requiring a prior judicial determination (Customs Tariff, Tariff Item 9897.00.00; s. 136(1)). The Supply Chains Act is triggered by reporting obligations applicable to covered institutions and entities (ss. 5, 9, 11). |
Administrative investigation and determination by competent authorities (Arts. 14–20). |
Sources of evidence |
Final domestic judgments, recognised international decisions, and recognised foreign judgments (Art. 3(§1)). |
Customs investigations, government reports, NGO reports, company disclosures and other relevant evidence (19 C.F.R. 12.42);Importer-provided evidence to rebut the forced labour presumption (UFLPA, s. 3). |
Customs investigations, governmental information and other available evidence. (Customs Tariff, s. 136(1));Company disclosures concerning supply-chain risks, due diligence processes and risk-management measures (Supply Chains Act, s. 11). |
Risk assessments, stakeholders information, investigations, information from civil society organisations, international organisations and public authorities.(Arts. 14, 17 and 18). |
Preventive intervention before judicial decision |
Limited. The legislation does not establish a risk-based administrative investigation mechanism capable of restricting products prior to judicial confirmation. |
Goods may be detained, excluded or seized pending investigation under the Section 307/WRO regime (19 C.F.R. 12.42-12.43); Goods linked to Xinjiang may be excluded from entry unless the importer rebuts that presumption (UFLPA, s. 3). |
Goods may be stopped under customs enforcement procedures without prior judicial findings (Customs Tariff, s. 136(1);No equivalent product-intervention mechanism in the Supply Chain Act. Enforcement occurs through monitoring of reporting obligations, corrective orders and penalties for non-compliance. (Supply Chains Act, ss. 14-19). |
Products may be investigated, withdrawn and prohibited following administrative determinations. (Arts. 17-29, 28 and 29). |
Due diligence obligation and defence |
Labour due diligence is defined as a dynamic, continuous and preventive process (Art. 2(III)).Importers may avoid penalties if they demonstrate adequate labour due diligence (Art. 4(§3)). |
No general statutory due diligence obligation under Section 307, but UFLPA establishes a clear evidentiary standard to rebut the forced labour presumption (UFLPA, Sec. 3(a)).No equivalent statutory defence. |
No mandatory due diligence obligation under the Customs Tariff. The Supply Chains Act requires covered entities to disclose due diligence and risk-management measures, if any (s. 11), but does not impose a due diligence duty.No equivalent statutory defence exists under either regime. |
Due diligence is central to the broader EU framework and highly relevant for enforcement and compliance efforts.No equivalent statutory defence. |
Table partially based on the ILO comparative analysis.
Suggested citation: L. Rocha, M. Kaizeler , ‘Can Brazil Keep Forced Labour Goods Out of Its Market? Understanding the New Brazilian Proposal on Forced Labour Ban ‘, NOVA BHRE Blog, 03 September 2026